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Abstract
I conduct a large-scale analysis on how students revise their educational expectations and
change their post-secondary education (PSE) pathways. I find evidence that an important
determinant is exposure to unexpected information on the quality of match between their
ability and academic difficulty of the program. This relationship is non-linear, and responsive
only to unexpected information that signals a mismatch. In Canada about 25% of freshman
experience a PSE path disruption, which entails a public and private cost. The findings
suggest that policy measures targeting to improve the quality of match through student
consultation could be employed to reduce this inefficiency.
JEL Classification: C21, I21
Keywords: Tertiary Education, Major Switch, Drop-out, Expectations, Grades
1 Introduction
Students choose to invest in post-secondary education (PSE) since more education is associ-
ated with higher future earnings (Card, 1999), as well as better non-pecuniary job benefits
(Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2009). They undertake this investment at a risk of failing to com-
plete the program and graduate. In fact in the United States, Zafar (2011) reports that 12%
of the students at Northwestern University’s undergraduate class of 2009 (survey conducted
∗While the research and analysis are based on data from Statistics Canada, the opinions expressed do not
represent the views of Statistics Canada. I thank Thanasis Stengos, Michael Hoy, and the session participants at
the 2013 CEA Annual Meetings and 2014 EEA Annual Congress. An earlier version of this paper has circulated
under the title “Tertiary Education Choices under Uncertainty.”
November 2006–February 2008) switch their major field of study after freshman year, Ar-
cidiacono (2004) using the nationally representative data from NLS721 reports that 18% of
undergraduate students switched major and 11% dropped out of college by 1974, and Stine-
brickner and Stinebrickner (2012) report that 40% of the students from low-income families
at Berea College (survey followed the starting cohort of 2001) drop out of college.
In this paper I use Canadian data from the Youth in Transition Survey (YITS) to study
this phenomenon. In the YITS, about 19% of the students who started a PSE program in the
2002–2003 academic year, report to have changed major and 7.8% dropped out after their
first year. In Canada, students have to make their choice of the major field of study before
they enroll in a PSE program. Differently from the United States, where students (depending
on the program) can choose their major field of study as late as their last year, Canadian
students are introduced earlier to major-specific courses. Hence, they are likely to realize
earlier if their choice is a mismatch with their ability and preferences.
The statistics shown in Table 1 indicate that among the students who report to have
switched major after their first year in PSE, about two-thirds (diagonal entries) switch to
a major that is within the same major grouping. The students that start in a major in
the Education, Arts, Humanities (EAH) group switch to STEM (Sciences, Technology and
Trades, Engineering, Math) and SSBA (Social Sciences and Business Administration) majors
in almost equal proportions (13.56 and 16.95 %, respectively). However, for the students that
initially start in a STEM major, most of the switchers transfer to a SSBA major. Regarding
those that start in a SSBA major, the proportion switching to a EAH major is higher than
those who transfer to a STEM major. SSBA majors also appear to be the group that retains
relatively less students when compared to the other two major groups.
The students that switch to a major not within the bigger groupings, usually have to start
the new program from year one because of differences in course content, and so most of the
course work completed in their first PSE program may not be credited into the second. In
Canada, the government subsidizes more than half of the tuition in post-secondary institu-
tions. Considering the province of Ontario only, for the starting year (2 semesters) in an Arts
major the provincial government invests CAD 3,100.00 per student in a university program
1National Longitudinal Study of the high school senior class of 1972.
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Table 1: Percent of students switching major
Switched Major Row % Total
EAH STEM SSBA (Obs. #)
S
ta
rt
in
g
M
a
jo
r EAH 69.49 13.56 16.95 100
(82) (16) (20) (118)
STEM 10.12 67.86 22.02 100
(17) (114) (37) (168)
SSBA 22.14 15.00 62.86 100
(31) (21) (88) (140)
Total (%) 30.52 35.45 34.04 100
(#) (130) (151) (145) (426)
Note: The first number in each cell is a percentage, the number in parenthesis
is an observation number. EAH: Education, Arts and Humanities. STEM:
Sciences, Technology and Trades, Math and Engineering. SSBA: Social Sci-
ences and Business Administration. The statistics for the majors that do not
fall within these categories are not shown in the table.
and CAD 4,400.00 per student in a college2 program. The per-student subsidy is higher for
business and technology majors, and much higher for the upper university years.3 The invest-
ment on the students that drop out after their freshman year, is a loss in net resources. The
same is valid for the subsidy invested in those who choose to switch to a different major and
have to start a new program from the beginning. Within this framework, for the province of
Ontario only, these PSE path disruptions translate on average to a cost of about 48 million
CAD per year of public spending. The overall social cost in the economy (public plus the
private individual cost) amounts to about 118 million CAD.4 Although individuals may still
learn something useful (besides that they disliked the program) and improve their skills by
2Differently from the United States, in Canada college and university refer to different academic entities. In
Canada, colleges offer vocational trades programs and Bachelor’s equivalent degrees in arts and sciences focused on
practical instruction. College professors in Canada focus on teaching and have extensive experience in the private
sector. Meanwhile, universities offer Bachelor’s degrees with research opportunities leading to graduate studies.
3For university Business and Technology majors the subsidy is CAD 5,800.00 and CAD 8,300.00, respectively. For
college Business and Technology majors these numbers are CAD 4,400.00 and CAD 5,700.00. For upper university
years the subsidy increases to CAD 5,800.00 for Arts and Business majors, and to CAD 8,300.00 for Technology
majors (see Trick, 2013, Table 3, p.31).
4Author’s calculations using data from the Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities, the YITS and Statis-
tics Canada. I add together the proportion of students in the YITS that drop out and switch program. Then, I
multiply this proportion with the total number of 19 year old students in Ontario, Canada that started a post-
secondary program in 2004 in a university and college, separately. This results in the total number of students
who disrupted their PSE path after their first year in PSE. This number is multiplied by the minimum amount of
subsidy that the government of Ontario invests on each new student in their first year of university (CAD 3,100.00)
and college (CAD 4,400.00). Similarly, I use tuition rates instead of subsidies to calculate the private cost.
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attending the time they did, yet the resources spent are not trivial and not used to their
full potential. Obviously, this points to an inefficiency in the economy and to identify policy
measures that minimize it, one should look deeper into how students make choices. The PSE
path disruptions (dropping out or changing program) are closely related to the uncertainty
of graduation (Hussey and Swinton, 2011; Altonji, 1993). In fact, in Canada, the proportion
of first year students that graduate varies between 65%–77%. Manski (1989) constructs a
model of PSE enrolment and completion where the role of the ex ante expected probability
of completion is emphasized. Earlier studies use choice data to infer about the way individ-
uals form expectations. This data limitations lead to the use of models that are framed by
strong assumptions. So, Manski (2004) highlights the importance of studying expectation
formation using subjective expectations and beliefs elicited directly from the respondent.
A few studies analyze expectation formation empirically, using data on elicited beliefs
about expected earnings (Dominitz, 1998), expected returns to schooling (Dominitz and Man-
ski, 1996) and the choice of contraception method (Delavande, 2008). Two recent papers apply
a similar idea to the expectation formation about PSE outcomes. Zafar (2011) finds that stu-
dents update their beliefs based on the unexpected content of information they receive from
the change in their grade point averages (GPA) from the first to the second semester in the
first year. Similarly, Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2012) confirms this result and finds
evidence that the student’s probability to drop out changes with the students’ learning about
their academic ability. Both, Zafar (2011) and Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2012) use
elicited subjective beliefs in probabilistic form. Both papers work with survey data collected
in one PSE institution, small sample sizes with little (or no) information about the students
before entering the institution. This limits their ability to account for the heterogeneity
among individuals. The single-institution surveys do not follow respondents unless they stay
within the institution where the survey is conducted. This leads to an overestimate in the
proportion of students that drop out and to an underestimate of the proportion of those who
switch program.
Differently from these two studies, I use elicited expected behavior variables since the YITS
is not built to elicit probabilistic expectations.5 However, the analysis in this paper remains
5Expected behaviour and probabilistic expectations differ in the following way: In order to elicit probabilistic
expectations the question starts by “What do you think is the percent chance that you ...?”. To elicit expected
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informative, and most importantly, it provides the first piece of evidence on how learning
about own ability influences educational expectation updating and PSE path disruptions as
students transition from high school to post-secondary education. Unlike Zafar (2011) and
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2012), the dataset I use provides a wealth of information on
a representative sample of the Canadian youth from most of the PSE institutions in Canada,
and thus big sample advantages. The longitudinal nature of the data allows tracking the
students across programs and institutions. I am able to separate among those students that
were required to leave the program because of a poor performance during the year. This
group were only 2.1 percent of the sample, and are excluded from the analysis. The main
specification is conditioned on a set of predetermined variables regarding the individual,
their family and socio-economic background. An important addition to this list is the set of
variables that describe the experience of the students in their first year of PSE. I estimate the
effect that learning about own academic performance, which is imbeded in the unexpected
change in GPA between high school and PSE, has on updating expectations about educational
attainment. I also investigate the role that learning has on two outcomes related to PSE: (i)
the probability to switch the major field of study (program) and (ii) the probability to drop
out of PSE.
The results indicate that a drop in the first year PSE grades relative to the high school
grades, is a main determinant affecting the revisions of educational expectations. A higher-
than-expected drop in grades may be perceived as a signal of a mismatch with the program
when students update their perceptions of their own ability to complete learning activities
in the program. Also, the probability of a path disruption in PSE increases if the students
experience an unexpected drop in GPA. This is not the case for unexpected increases in
grades. The students react to their choices only when they think they are making worse
progress compared to the average student in the same major and institution as theirs. Even
though the paper cannot provide evidence on the rationale behind this asymmetric behavior,
as in Dominitz (1998), one presumption that can be deducted from the results and that could
apply to this contexts as well may be that a drop in grades beyond what is expected may be
viewed as more persistent than an increase.
behavior the question starts by “Do you expect to..(tick one of the increasing categories that applies)...?”.
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Based on the evidence provided by this paper, a way of decreasing path disruptions in PSE
is by improving the match between the student academic ability and program requirements.
Castleman and Goodman (2014) investigate Bottom Line, a college advising program that op-
erates in Boston and Worcester, Massachusetts. This program assists senior year high school
students from low-income families to find a PSE institution that is a good match in terms of
graduation probability, potential academic success and debt accumulation upon graduation.
The authors present compelling evidence that consultation significantly increases access, per-
sistence and completion in higher education. Hence, while the PSE path disruptions cannot
be completely eliminated, consultation services for students during high school seems to be
a policy intervention that could guide them in making better choices. Consultation sessions
could be targeted to inform students about the course content, academic difficulty and job
prospects of the different PSE programs. Individual and intensive assistance like Bottom Line
provides may be more costly than group information sessions but could potentially be more
effective.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I summarize the model that serves as basis
for the main specification. Section 3 describes the data and section 4 discusses the empirical
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Approach
The empirical specification in this paper is based on the evidence provided by Zafar (2011),
that students update their educational expectations through a process that is consistent
with a Bayesian updating model. The paper shows that students update their expectations
as a result of the signals they derive from changes in their academic performance that is
reflected in their grades. The process of educational expectation formation for a rational
individual is based on the currently available information, and updated in the interim based
on new information obtained. Zafar (2011) argues that, to some extend, a part of the new
information can be anticipated by the individual, and separating this from the unanticipated
part, enables one to attach a causal explanation to the relationship between unanticipated
information and expectations revision.
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Expressed in technical terms, expectations updating on the value of a future event, X, can
be defined as a function of surprises that the individual encounters between time t and t+ 1.
The surprises are defined as new information, ωit+1, minus its predictable part, E(ωit+1|Ωit),
where Ωit is the information that the individual is exposed to at time t, and assumed to
be remembered at time t + 1, too. The individuals are assumed to be rational decision
makers who use all available information when forming expectations. Any revision on their
expectations regarding event X is determined by a function, ψ(.), of unexpected information
shocks received at time t+ 1 that can be summarized by equation (1) as follows.
Xeit+1 −Xeit = ψ (ωit+1 − E(ωit+1|Ωit)) (1)
In this paper, the Canadian Youth in Transition Survey (YITS) is exploited to build the
outcome and independent variables of interest. The outcome of interest for this part of the
analysis is expectations about the highest level of education that students plan to attain. Xeit
and Xeit+1 are their responses two years apart. The survey timeline is shown in Figure 1. In
this context, the source of new information equals the unexpected portion of the change in
the GPA from high school to PSE. The students were asked in Winter 2002 (January–April)
about their high school GPA realized until December 2001. Then, they were interviewed
again in Winter 2004 and asked to report the first year PSE grade realized until December
2003. Unlike previous studies that use the change in GPA within the first few semesters in
PSE, by using the change in GPA between high school and PSE I capture the initial learning
about own ability that students experience during their transition from high school to PSE.
Referring to equation (1) above, ωit+1 in this case represents the grade change that the
younger cohort experiences between high school and first year in PSE, ∆GPA = GPAPSE −
GPAHS . Following previous literature, I assume that the only source of information that
drives educational expectation updating in this context is deducted from ∆GPA. However,
unlike Zafar (2011) that lacks measures for inherent ability, commitment or effort of students
during PSE studies, I am able to relax the assumption that the process of expectations
updating is independent of these individual characteristics.
The distinction between ∆GPAit+1 and (∆GPAit+1 − E(∆GPAit+1|Ωit)) is crucial. To
explain this point, suppose the change in realized GPA, i.e. ∆GPA, is positive. Then we
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Figure 1: Timeline of the survey questions
may confound a positive piece of information with a negative one if the first year PSE grades
increased by less than the student expected. This highlights the importance of separating out
the predictable or expected part of the change in GPA. Unfortunately, the YITS did not ask
the students on how much they expect their GPA to change in their first year in PSE relative
to their high school GPA. Thus I lack a directly elicited measure for E(∆GPAit+1|Ωit).
Instead I use a proxy variable to estimate as closely as possible how the students expect their
grades will change between high school and PSE. The approach I use assumes that the most
important source of information can be retrieved from the older cohort’s performance in the
exact same institution and similar program. This is a plausible assumption since friends,
family and relatives usually share experiences about the difficulty of the program they are
following. With this information in mind, and taking into consideration own abilities and
commitment to studying, a student may create an educated prediction on the change in GPA
that (s)he will likely experience. Hence, I use the average change in grades of the students in
the older cohort of YITS to construct the proxy. As long as the PSE institutions are consistent
in their selection procedures and thus enroll systematically a similar intake of students each
year, approach delivers a reasonable estimate of the expected change in GPA.
I build three different proxy variables. They differ on the extent of similarity between the
matches (students from the older cohort) and the matched student (from the younger cohort).
The first proxy variable is calculated by the following formula: ∆GPAei =
1
nhg
∑nhg
j ∆GPAj
where nhg is the number of students in the older cohort of YITS that attended a similar
program6 h in the same institution g as the reference student from the younger cohort of
6The following classification is used to separate majors into similar fields of study groups: (1) Education, (2)
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YITS, student i. By matching on the institution and major, I implicitly assume that the
students’ academic achievement in PSE is independent of their high school grades, which is
in practice a strong assumption. In order to relax this assumption I build a second proxy
that in addition to major and institution, matches individuals on the high school GPA, too.
In that case the proxy is calculated by the following formula: ∆GPAei =
1
nhgk
∑nhgk
j ∆GPAj
where nhgk is the number of students in the older cohort of YITS that attended a similar
program h in the same institution g, that has the same reported GPA category k as the
reference student from the younger cohort of YITS, student i. Finally, I construct a third
proxy such that ∆GPAei =
1
nhgks
∑nhgks
j ∆GPAj where nhgks is the number of students in the
older cohort of YITS that attended a similar program h, in the same institution g, that has
the same reported GPA category k, and is of the same gender s as the reference student from
the younger cohort of YITS, student i. This alternative proxy variable takes into account the
achievement gaps between the two genders.
The analysis in the first part of the paper is built around equation (2), which initially
assumes a linear functional form for ψ(.) which is then relaxed. Moreover, it allows for
heterogeneous individuals and accounts for this heterogeneity by conditioning on a set of
individual and family characteristics represented by the vector Zit.
∆Expit+1 = β0 + β1
(
∆GPAit+1 −∆GPAeit+1
)
+ γZit + it+1 (2)
where it+1 is a N(0, σ
2
 ) idiosyncratic error term. The variables included in Zit are de-
mographic and parental characteristics, and variables the describe the students’ experience
during their first year in PSE. The later set of variables accounts for the students’ commit-
ment and effort during their freshman year. Omitting these variables would otherwise bias
upward the coefficient on the (unexpected) change in grades considering the positive effect
that effort has on academic performance (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2008). In the cur-
rent context, the focus is on the change in grades (rather than its level), thus this correlation
is expected to be relatively lower.
Fine and applied arts, (3) Humanities and related fields, (4) Social Sciences and Law, (5) Business and Public
Administration, (6) Math and Physics Sciences, (7) Engineering and Applied Sciences, (8) Engineering and Applied
Sciences: technologies and trades, (9) Agriculture and biological sciences/technologies, (10) Health professions,
sciences and technologies.
9
3 Data
The Youth in Transition Survey was conducted at the same time on two cohorts of different
ages. The younger cohort is first interviewed when 15 years old and then interviewed bi-
anually in another four cycles. I am interested in their choices when they are 19 years old.
At this age 92% of the students have completed high school, and among these 71% continued
their studies into PSE and 29% never enrolled in a PSE program. The analysis in this paper
is based mainly on the younger cohort and is complemented by data from the older cohort.
The older cohort participants were between the age of 18–20 when first interviewed. Each
student in the older cohort is 3 to 5 years older than the students in the younger cohort.
Table 2 shows the student GPA distribution in the YITS. High school GPA is elicited
from the following question: “In your last year of high school, (junior high or elementary
school), what was your overall grade average, as a percentage?”. The GPA in the first year
PSE program is retrieved from the following question: “In your first year, what was your
overall grade average as a percentage?”. The students were asked to check one of the 10
grade point categories listed in the first panel of Table 2. More than 90% of the students
report a high school GPA of 70% or higher. The grades are self-reported by the students, and
the possibility that they may be overstated can not be ruled out even though the categorical
nature of the responses helps mitigate the measurement error. Also, it should be noted
that a drop in the PSE grades relative to high school grades, for example from 81% to 79% is
recorded as one category drop, and a drop from 89% to 79% is also recorded as a one category
drop. Experiencing a drop in grades is common for the younger cohort (55%). Only 32% of
the students manage to keep their grades within the 10 grade category of their high school
GPA and only 12% experience an increase. Using the data from the older cohort of YITS,
I calculate the average change in GPA for each program in the data. On average, in 61% of
the PSE programs the students experience a drop. From the last column in panel B of the
table, we can see that the chances that students experience an unexpected decrease rather
than an increase in GPA are almost twice as high.
The expectations about future educational attainment are elicited by the following ques-
tion: “As things stand now, what is the highest level of education you think you will get?”.
The question is carefully formulated to retrieve Xei . The students were asked to choose one of
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Table 2: Percent of students with reported GPA categories
Panel A: Percentage of students with reported GPA categories, Younger Cohort
High School GPA First year PSE GPA
90% or above 14.92 6.69
80-89% 44.40 26.52
70-79% 33.89 41.71
60-69% 6.01 20.23
50-59% 0.49 3.83
Under 50% 0.29 1.03
Observations 6504 6504
Panel B: Percentage of students with negative, zero and positive changes in GPA
Younger Cohort Older Cohort Younger Cohort
∆GPA ∆GPA ∆GPA−∆GPAe
Negative 55 61 41
Zero 32 22 37
Positive 12 17 22
the following ten levels of education: (1) Some High School or less, (2) High school diploma,
(3) Some post-secondary education level courses (no diploma or degree), (4) Private business
school or commercial school diploma, (5) College, CEGEP, or trade/vocational certificate or
diploma, (6) University degree or certificate below Bachelor’s degree, (7) University Bachelor’s
degree, (8) University first professional degree (medicine, dentistry, veterinary medicine, law,
optometry, divinity), (9) Master’s degree or University graduate diploma or certificate (above
Bachelor’s degree), (10) PhD (or other earned doctorate, D.Sc., D.Ed.). In order to organize
them in a clear ranking of the educational levels, I re-code as one category the fourth, fifth
and sixth category. I also re-code the seventh and eighth category in a single category. Tech-
nically, this rearrangement eventually generated seven categories for each of the expectations
elicited at age 17 and 19. Using these variables I build the change in expectations, that is
simply the difference between the two categorical variables. The difference in practice con-
tains values between [−4, 4]. This means that students update upto four categories upwards
or downwards. Table 3 contains a tabulation of the responses aggregated to fewer categories
at age 17 and 19. One can observe some significant expectations updating after the students
go through the first year in PSE given that just about half of the students keep the same
expectations.7
7In comparison to students that enroll in a PSE program, those that never enroll have very low expectations
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Table 3: Transition matrix of percentage of students between prior and posterior educational
expectations
Posterior Expectations (Age 19) Cell %
Less than College Bachelor’s Graduate (Row %)
College Diploma Diploma Degree Degree [Column %]
P
ri
or
E
x
p
ec
ta
ti
on
s
(A
ge
17
)
Less than College Diploma - 2.90 1.65 - 4.55
(-) (63.73) (36.27) (-) (100)
[-] [11.75] [3.47] [-] [4.55]
College Diploma 0.49 13.46 4.79 0.74 19.49
(2.53) (69.07) (24.60) (3.8) (100)
[41.56] [54.56] [10.07] [2.97] [19.49]
Bachelor’s Degree 0.69 6.64 29.97 11.92 49.22
(1.41) (13.50) (60.88) (24.21) (100)
[58.44] [26.94] [62.95] [44.89] [49.22]
Graduate Degree - 1.66 11.91 13.89 26.75
(-) (6.2) (41.84) (51.93) (100)
[-] [6.75] [23.51] [52.32] [26.75]
Total 1.19 24.66 47.60 26.55 100
(1.19) (24.66) (47.60) (26.55) (100)
[100] [100] [100] [100] [100]
Note: Each entry is a percentage of the respondents. Sample size is 6504. The educational expectation categories are defined
as follows: Less than College Diploma contains: (1) Some High School or less, (2) High school diploma, (3) Some post-secondary
education level courses (no diploma or degree); College Diploma contains: (4) Private business school or commercial school
diploma, (5) College, CEGEP, or trade/vocational certificate or diploma, (6) University degree or certificate below Bachelor’s
degree; Bachelor’s Degree contains: (7) University Bachelor’s degree, (8) University first professional degree (medicine, dentistry,
veterinary medicine, law, optometry, divinity); Graduate Degree contains: (9) Master’s degree or University graduate diploma
or certificate (above Bachelor’s degree), (10) PhD or other earned doctorate, D.Sc., D.Ed..
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In Table A.1 I present summary statistics for all dependent and independent variables
used in the empirical analysis. I group the independent control variables in three groups:
Individual level variables, Parental characteristics and First year variables. Individual level
variables that include PISA score8, Female, Single, Canadian citizen, Province of residence 9,
Rural residency dummies, and Highest education level attended (Bachelor and College pro-
gram dummies); Parental characteristics that include Parental education category dummies,
Parental income and income squared, Parental monetary transfers in the first year PSE; First
year variables that include “Sure for type of work”, “Workshops to adjust”dummy10, “Hours
homework”11, “Times thought dropping out”12. I construct four more variables by using
survey questions that ask for Likert-scale responses on the degree of agreement: “The right
program”13, “Idea for future plans”14, “Job market skills”15 and “Sure for type of work”16.
All categorical variables enter in the regression analysis as dummy variables indicating some
of the categories as listed in Table A.1.
In the sample, about 56% of the individuals are female, 96 % are single, and 95% are
Canadian citizens. In this group, 24% first started their PSE studies in a college and 66%
started a program in a university. About a third of the students have a university graduate
mother and father. During their first year in PSE, 80% of the students dedicate more than
eight hours of studying per week to their homework, 20% of them indicate that they attended
since age 17. About one quarter (27.23%) of this group report that they expect their highest level of educational
attainment to be lower than a College diploma, compared to 4.55% in Table 3; 40.97% report a College Diploma,
compared to 19.49% in Table 3; and 31.80% report a university degree (Bachelor’s or graduate), compared to 75.97%
in Table 3.
8Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) reading test score.
9Indicator variables for each of the provinces: Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia,
New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland and Labrador. The omitted category is Ontario. Observa-
tions from the province of Quebec are excluded due to their CGEP system that can be confounded with a college
program by respondents.
10The survey asks to answer by yes or no to: “During or before your first year, did you take part in any workshops,
programs or courses designed to help you adjust to first-year studies?”.
11The survey asks students to answer the question by picking one of multiple choice answers (Zero, Less than one
hour per week, 1–3 hours, 4–7 hours, 8–14 hours, 15–20 hours, 21–30 hours and More than 30 hours per week) to
the question: “During your first year, about how many hours each week did you spend studying or doing assigned
work outside of class?”
12The survey asks students to answer the question by picking one of multiple choice answers to the question:
“How many times per month did you think about dropping out. Was it ...?” Never, Less than once a month, Once
or twice a month, About once a week, More than once a week.
13The survey question is: “During my first year, I felt I had found the right program for me.”
14The survey question is: “During my first year, helped me get a better idea of my future plans.”
15The survey question is: “My first year, gave me skills that help me in the job market.”
16The survey question is: “During my first year, I was sure of the type of work I would like to have in the future.”
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workshops to adjust to the PSE experience and about 30% thought at least once per month
of dropping out of the program. The PISA score, which serves as a measure of cognitive
ability, has a central role in accounting for the inherent heterogeneity among respondents.
In the overall sample, the score has a mean (standard deviation) of 560.36 (85.92). Among
the major switchers the mean (standard deviation) for the PISA score is actually above the
sample average and has a lower variance, 575.74 (78.70), and those who drop out have a lower
PISA score on average, 542.55 (81.79), with lower variance than the overall sample. However,
the mean differences are statistically insignificant.
4 Results
4.1 Updating educational expectations
Regression estimates of equation (2) are shown in Table 4. The dependent variable is cate-
gorical and takes count values between [−4, 4]. Positive values indicate an upward revision on
educational attainment expectations, zero indicates no change in expectations, and a negative
value indicates a downward revision. Figure A.1 plots the empirical distribution of the depen-
dent variable and that of a theoretical normal distribution with the same mean and standard
deviation. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates that the empirical distribution cannot be
distinguished from the theoretical normal distribution (p-value=0.743), and hence the choice
of least squares estimator. The specification in the first versus the other three panels differ
in the independent variable of interest. In Panel 1 the variable that captures learning is the
change in GPA. In the other three panels three different definitions of the expected change in
GPA, ∆GPAe, are used to build the unexpected change in GPA, ∆GPA −∆GPAe, which
is used separately as the independent variables of interest.
In both cases the coefficients are positive and statistically significant suggesting an in-
crease in the expected level of education if the students’ GPA in first year PSE increases
by one category relative to their high school GPA. In order to account for the heterogeneity
in expectation formation, I condition on a set of variables. The step-wise addition of the
individual, parental and first year variables leads to a better fit for the model. The third
column in each table represents the common specification used in the literature so far (Za-
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far, 2011; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2012) that incorporates several basic demographic
characteristics in the estimation. However, unlike previous literature I have available for use
a measure for inherent ability (PISA score measured at age 15), and several variables that
inform about the effort and commitment of students during their first year in PSE. These
are incorporated in the specifications shown in columns (4) and (5) of the table. Based on
the results of the first panel, a one category increase in GPA change increases the revisions
of educational expectations by a modest 0.09 categories. In column (5) I add in interaction
term of the ∆GPA with a dummy variable that indicates negative values of ∆GPA. The
estimates indicate that if students experience an increase or no change in GPA (positive val-
ues of ∆GPA) they do not revise their expectations (coefficient is statistically insignificant).
However, they revise their expectations when faced with decreases in GPA. For the negative
values of ∆GPA), a one category decrease (as ∆GPA becomes more negative) leads to a
downward revision of 0.17 categories in educational expectations. This relationship can be
more easily seen in Figure 2(a).
Note that when we compare coefficients of Panel 2 to those of Panel 3 and 4 the coefficients
are reduced in magnitude. In comparison to Panel 2, the unexpected change in GPA is
less prone to measurement error when Proxy 2 and 3 are used for ∆GPAe because they
match younger cohort to older cohort students based on their GPA, and on both GPA and
gender, respectively, in addition to the PSE institution and similar major field of study.
As a result there is a consistent decrease in the coefficient estimates from Panel 2 to 4.
The differences between the estimates of Panel 1 and Panel 4 indicate that when using
unexpected change in GPA the effect on revising expectations is much smaller, and the
difference between coefficients is statistically significant. Since ∆GPA is an imperfect measure
of a shock in how the GPA of the students evolves, by subtracting the anticipated part of
it the measure ∆GPA − ∆GPAe gets closer to the true value of the shock. Hence using
the former may lead to an overestimate of the effect if we observe a ∆GPA that is much
smaller than ∆GPA −∆GPAe, and an underestimate if vice versa. If ∆GPAe was elicited
directly from the students, the bias would depend on how optimistic are students in forming
expectations about their GPA changes.
Next, I consider a nonlinear functional form for ψ(.) and I use partially linear regression
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Table 4: ∆Exp as a function of changes in GPA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel 1: Change in GPA
∆GPA 0.076*** 0.079*** 0.082*** 0.093*** -0.024
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.026) (0.051)
Interaction 0.168**
(0.067)
Joint Test (p-value) 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.027 0.028
Sample Size 6504 6504 6504 6504 6504
Panel 2: Unexpected Change in GPA, Proxy 1 used for ∆GPAe
∆GPA−∆GPAe 0.119*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.100*** 0.047*
(0.020)c (0.020)c (0.020)c (0.021) (0.028)
Interaction 0.102***
(0.038)
Joint Test (p-value) 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.010 0.012 0.013 0.028 0.031
Sample Size 6504 6504 6504 6504 6504
Panel 3: Unexpected Change in GPA, Proxy 2 used for ∆GPAe
∆GPA−∆GPAe 0.072*** 0.076*** 0.079*** 0.082*** -0.037
(0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) (0.073)
Interaction 0.158*
(0.088)
Joint Test (p-value) 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.003 0.006 0.009 0.027 0.031
Sample Size 6326 6326 6326 6326 6326
Panel 4: Unexpected Change in GPA, Proxy 3 used for ∆GPAe
∆GPA−∆GPAe 0.036** 0.034** 0.034** 0.033* 0.006
(0.016)c (0.017)b (0.017)b (0.017)b (0.021)
Interaction 0.073**
(0.037)c
Joint Test (p-value) 0.028
Pseudo R2 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.023 0.025
Sample Size 6326 6326 6326 6326 6326
Individual Variables X X X X
Parental Variables X X X
First Year Variables X X
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. The
interaction term refers to an interaction variable between the (unexpected) change in GPA and a
dummy indicator for negative values of this variable. The “Joint test” is a chi-squared test on the
joint significance of the two parameters reported for each regression. The different definitions of
the ∆GPAe proxies are as follows: Proxy 1 matches on the the exact PSE institution and similar
major field of study; Proxy 2 matches on the the exact PSE institution, similar major field of study
and high school GPA category; Proxy 3 matches on the the exact PSE institution, similar major
field of study, high school GPA category, and gender.
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to estimate the relationship between the update in expectations and the information shocks.
In Figure 2 I show this relationship. Graph 2(a) shows regression estimates using ∆GPA,
and graph 2(b) plots in addition to 2(a) the regression using (∆GPA − ∆GPAe) as the
independent variable. Similar to the results of Table 4 column (5), Figure 2 suggests that
educational expectations revisions are responsive only to unexpected negative changes in
GPA. Students are indifferent to positive, or no changes in GPA.
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Figure 2: Expectations updating as a function of (unexpected) change in GPA
Note: The variable plotted in the y-axis is the fitted residual of specification (4) in Table 4 excluding change in GPA
as a covariate. This ensures that all heterogeneity from other observed factors is netted out of the ∆Exp, except for
the variable of interest. The figure shows the local polynomial regression (third degree polynomial, Epanechnikov
kernel, and unit bandwidth) of the fitted residuals on the (unexpected) change in GPA. The proxy variable for
∆GPAe used in the construction of the unexpected change in GPA is Proxy 1 that matches on the the exact PSE
institution and similar major field of study.
Although the dependent variable, ∆Exp, aims to use all available information by exploit-
ing all the individuals together without splitting the analysis into subsamples, however, it is
important to note that the meaning carried by each of the categories of the variable (indicated
by the integers [−4, 4]) is complex. For instance, a value of “1” in the dependent variable,
∆Exp, indicates a mechanical one category upward revision in educational expectations. Its
meaning could represent a revision from a Bachelor’s degree to a Master’s for one student,
but also a revision from a College Diploma to a Bachelor’s Degree. For that reason, I con-
sider other alternatives to the dependent variable definition that refer to one type of revision
at a time. I firstly aggregate the educational categories in the same fashion as in Table 3.
Then I define eight dummy variables that indicate an educational expectation by “1” and
no revision by zero. The definition of the variables is included in the footnote of Table A.2,
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that also contains the regression estimates. The reported coefficients are the marginal effects
of probit regressions, and represent a change in the probability of revising expectations as
indicated by the dependent variables. The dependent variables in columns (2), (3), and (6)
indicate upward revisions in expectations to a higher educational category. The rest indicate
downward revisions in expectations to a lower educational category. The fit of the regressions
is much higher than those in Table 4. Overall the results are consistent with those shown
in Table 4 – with an increase in the unexpected shock the probability to revise expectations
upwards increases and the probability to revise them downwards decreases. In most of the
cases results indicate that the students revise expectations more as a result of negative shocks
and are indifferent to positive shocks.
4.2 PSE outcomes
Arcidiacono (2004) and Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2012) find that students change
their PSE path as they learn about their academic ability through academic performance.
In fact in the YITS, when asked “What is the main reason you changed it [major]?”, 41% of
the students responded by “Didn’t like it/not for me” and 38% of the students answered by
“Interest in new subject”. I use the specification in equation (3) to test whether an unexpected
change in grades affects the probability of switching major and dropping out of PSE.
P (Yit+1 = 1) = β0 + β1
(
∆GPAit+1 −∆GPAeit+1
)
+ γZit + νit+1 (3)
where Y is the outcome, Zi the vector of control variables (defined in Section 2) for each
respondent i and it+1 is a normally distributed N(0, σ
2
ν) error term. The estimation results
are summarized in Tables 5 and 6. For both outcomes the step-wise addition of the control
variables contributes to a better fit of the regression model, but also more than halves the
coefficient on the independent variable of interest. Referring to column (4) in Table 5, the
estimates indicate that an unexpected increase of one category in GPA decreases the proba-
bility to switch major by 2.6 percentage points. When the unexpected change in GPA is used
this coefficient drops to 1.7–1.9 percentage points, even though they are statistically indistin-
guishable. As we can see from column (5), including the change in expectations variable in
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this regression does not affect the coefficient on the (unexpected) change in GPA. However,
this is affected by the addition of the interaction variable. In all three panels in column
(6) it looses statistical significance, but the joint significance tests with the interaction term
indicate they are jointly different from zero.
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Figure 3: Probability to switch major and drop out as a function of (unexpected) change in GPA
Note: The variable plotted in the y-axis is the fitted residual of specification (4) in Tables 5 and 6, respectively,
excluding change in GPA as a covariate. This ensures that all heterogeneity from other observed factors is netted
out of the dependent variable, except for the covariate of interest. The figure shows the local polynomial regression
(third degree polynomial, Epanechnikov kernel, and unit bandwidth) of the fitted residuals on the (unexpected)
change in GPA. The proxy variable for ∆GPAe used in the construction of the unexpected change in GPA is Proxy
1 that matches on the the exact PSE institution and similar major field of study.
The results presented in Table 6 suggest a decrease of 1.7 percentage points for a one
category increase in the ∆GPA. When I use the unexpected change in GPA the coefficient
drops, but the difference is statistically insignificant except for Panel 3. Differently from Table
5, the change in expectations variable (∆Exp) has a consistent and statistically significant
effect on the probability to drop out of PSE in Panels 2–4. This is not the case in Panel 1.
The addition of the interaction term allows for the coefficient on the GPA change to differ for
negative variable values. As shown in column (6) this difference in not statistically significant.
In Figure 3 I allow for a non-linear relationship between (unexpected) change in GPA for both
outcomes separately. For the probability of switching major, the choice of the variable in the
x-axis seems to matter given the differences in the graphical representation of the non-linear
regression. However, this is not the case for the graph (b) where the plots almost overlap.
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Table 5: Probability to switch major and changes in GPA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel 1: Change in GPA
∆GPA -0.066*** -0.059*** -0.056*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.018
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.018)
∆Exp 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.005)
Interaction -0.009
(0.021)
Joint test (p=value) 0.004
Pseudo R2 0.034 0.050 0.056 0.132 0.133 0.133
Sample Size 5275 5275 5275 5275 5275 5275
Panel 2: Unexpected Change in GPA, Proxy 1 used for ∆GPAe
∆GPA−∆GPAe -0.049*** -0.043*** -0.041*** -0.017** -0.017*** -0.010
(0.007)b (0.007)b (0.007)b (0.007) (0.007) (0.011)
∆Exp 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.005)
Interaction -0.011
(0.012)
Joint test (p=value) 0.036
Pseudo R2 0.019 0.043 0.053 0.149 0.149 0.149
Sample Size 5275 5275 5275 5275 5275 5275
Panel 3: Unexpected Change in GPA, Proxy 2 used for ∆GPAe
∆GPA−∆GPAe -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.018** -0.019*** -0.004
(0.007)a (0.007)a (0.007)b (0.007) (0.007) (0.011)
∆Exp 0.003 0.003
(0.005) (0.006)
Interaction -0.022*
(0.012)
Joint test (p=value) 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.009 0.038 0.049 0.150 0.150 0.152
Sample Size 4697 4697 4697 4697 4697 4697
Panel 4: Unexpected Change in GPA, Proxy 3 used for ∆GPAe
∆GPA−∆GPAe -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.009
(0.007)a (0.007)a (0.007)b (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
∆Exp 0.003 0.003
(0.006) (0.006)
Interaction -0.018
(0.012)
Joint test (p=value) 0.004
Pseudo R2 0.012 0.035 0.045 0.149 0.149 0.150
Sample Size 4697 4697 4697 4697 4697 4697
Individual Variables X X X X X
Parental Variables X X X X
First Year Variables X X X
Note: The coefficient estimates are marginal effects from probit regressions. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Statistical significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. The interaction term refers to an interaction variable between the
(unexpected) change in GPA and a dummy indicator for negative values of this variable. The “Joint test” is a
chi-squared test on the joint significance of the (unexpected) change in GPA and the Interaction parameters. The
different definitions of the ∆GPAe proxies are as follows: Proxy 1 matches on the the exact PSE institution and
similar major field of study; Proxy 2 matches on the the exact PSE institution, similar major field of study and high
school GPA category; Proxy 3 matches on the the exact PSE institution, similar major field of study, high school
GPA category, and gender.
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Table 6: Probability to drop out and changes in GPA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel 1: Change in GPA
∆GPA -0.019*** -0.025*** -0.029*** -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.021**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011)
∆Exp -0.003 -0.011***
(0.002) (0.003)
Interaction 0.007
(0.013)
Joint test (p=value) 0.002
Pseudo R2 0.010 0.048 0.074 0.214 0.280 0.280
Sample Size 5804 5804 5804 5804 5804 5804
Panel 2: Unexpected Change in GPA, Proxy 1 used for ∆GPAe
∆GPA−∆GPAe -0.026*** -0.029*** -0.031*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.012**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
∆Exp -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.003) (0.003)
Interaction -0.004
(0.007)
Joint test (p=value) 0.036
Pseudo R2 0.019 0.056 0.079 0.215 0.223 0.224
Sample Size 5804 5804 5804 5804 5804 5804
Panel 3: Unexpected Change in GPA, Proxy 2 used for ∆GPAe
∆GPA−∆GPAe -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.007*
(0.004) (0.004)c (0.004)b (0.003)c (0.003) (0.004)
∆Exp -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.003) (0.003)
Interaction -0.005
(0.011)
Joint test (p=value) 0.118
Pseudo R2 0.010 0.045 0.065 0.213 0.221 0.221
Sample Size 5528 5528 5528 5528 5528 5528
Panel 4: Unexpected Change in GPA, Proxy 3 used for ∆GPAe
∆GPA−∆GPAe -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.008***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
∆Exp -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.004) (0.004)
Interaction -0.005
(0.007)
Joint test (p=value) 0.006
Pseudo R2 0.012 0.069 0.087 0.226 0.238 0.239
Sample Size 5528 5528 5528 5528 5528 5528
Individual Variables X X X X X
Parental Variables X X X X
First Year Variables X X X
Note: The coefficient estimates are marginal effects from probit regressions. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Statistical significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. The interaction term refers to an interaction variable between the
(unexpected) change in GPA and a dummy indicator for negative values of this variable. The “Joint test” is a chi-
squared test on the joint significance of the (unexpected) change in GPA and the Interaction parameters. The different
definitions of the ∆GPAe proxies are as follows: Proxy 1 matches on the the exact PSE institution and similar major
field of study; Proxy 2 matches on the the exact PSE institution, similar major field of study and high school GPA
category; Proxy 3 matches on the the exact PSE institution, similar major field of study, high school GPA category,
and gender.
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5 Conclusion and discussion
Post-secondary education in Canada is partly subsidized by the provincial government. When
faced with high proportions of dropouts and major switchers, even for a single year, the cost
can be significant. Students (or their parents) invest in PSE uncertain of whether they will
complete the program. Rational decision-makers rely on all possible sources of information
to form expectations about the probability of graduating from a post-secondary education
program. This paper investigates how students update their higher educational expectations.
I find evidence that the main driving force behind expectation revisions is the information that
students derive from unexpected changes in their academic performance, which is measured
by the difference in the GPA between high school and the PSE freshman year. Through this
information they learn about their own academic ability and its match with the difficulty
of the program that they are attending. I demonstrate that the relationship between the
unexpected change in grades and expectation updating is non-linear. Students revise their
educational expectations when they experience an unexpected drop in GPA, but they are
indifferent to positive changes in GPA. This paper also tests whether the unexpected change
in grades affects the dropout decision and the decision to switch major. An unexpected one
category increase in this variable leads to a decrease of 1.9 percentage points in the probability
to switch major, and to a decrease of 1.2 percentage points in the probability to drop out a
PSE program.
Students may be conscious of their ability, but they may not be well informed about how
their skills fit with the different programs. The findings in this paper indicate that a signal
of mismatch between the student’s background and the difficulty of the program increases
the probability of a path disruption. The unexpected change in grades may be not the only
factor influencing educational expectations and outcomes, preferences could also have an
important role. However, they may be thought as interrelated. In one hand a student that
does not enjoy the courses will not be motivated to work hard for the exams, and on the
other hand a student that is not achieving performance levels above average of their peers
will question their choice of major. It is not in the scope of this study to separate the two
channels, and the effect estimated in this paper reflects a composite effect. Recent literature
(Castleman and Goodman, 2014) provides evidence that student consultation during the
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last year of high school improves the quality of match between the student (preferences and
ability) and the program of study, and leads to higher retention rates in PSE. These type of
policy interventions seem to matter in decreasing the likelihood of path disruptions, which
will consequently diminish the inefficiencies in the public cost of education.
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Figure A.1: Kernel estimate of the ∆Exp distribution plotted against a normal distribution
Table A.1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent variables
∆Exp 6504 0.072 1.388
Major Switch 5275 0.193 0.395
Drop out 6106 0.078 0.268
Independent control variables
PISA score 6504 560.359 85.915
Female 6504 0.559 0.496
Single 6504 0.960 0.193
Citizen 6504 0.947 0.223
Rural 6504 0.336 0.472
Province of Residence:
Newfoundland 6504 0.101 0.302
Prince Edward Island 6504 0.072 0.259
Nova Scotia 6504 0.135 0.342
New Brunswick 6504 0.126 0.331
Manitoba 6504 0.093 0.291
Saskatchewan 6504 0.086 0.280
Alberta 6504 0.085 0.279
British Columbia 6504 0.104 0.306
Mother Education:
Some College 6504 0.077 0.267
College 6504 0.319 0.466
First Professional degree 6504 0.040 0.198
Bachelor’s 6504 0.176 0.381
Graduate 6504 0.047 0.211
Father Education:
Some College 6504 0.062 0.242
College 6504 0.295 0.456
26
Table A.1: Summary statistics (cont.’d)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
First Professional degree 6504 0.033 0.179
Bachelor’s 6504 0.166 0.372
Graduate 6504 0.099 0.299
Family Income 6504 355.985 243.028
Parental Monetary Transfers 6504 2296.742 3914.900
Highest Education Level Attended :
Bachelor’s Equivalent 6504 0.659 0.474
College Equivalent 6504 0.236 0.424
Times thought dropping out :
Less than once a month 6504 0.126 0.332
Once or twice a month 6504 0.128 0.334
About once a week 6504 0.031 0.174
More than once a week 6504 0.024 0.154
The right program:
Agree 6504 0.554 0.497
Strongly Agree 6504 0.203 0.402
Idea for future plans:
Agree 6504 0.637 0.480
Strongly Agree 6504 0.224 0.417
Job market skills:
Agree 6504 0.555 0.496
Strongly Agree 6504 0.152 0.359
Sure for type of work :
Agree 6504 0.478 0.499
Strongly Agree 6504 0.125 0.330
Workshops to adjust 6504 0.198 0.399
Hours of homework :
8 to 14 hours 6504 0.323 0.467
15 to 20 hours 6504 0.305 0.460
21 to 30 hours 6504 0.144 0.352
More than 30 hours per week 6504 0.064 0.245
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